A comment on this blog doesn’t usually turn into a blog entry, but it happens. Kinda like, as follows.

Someone who goes by “s” posted this as a comment to the last blog entry here:

Once again, Ayoob lies and creates evidence from thin air when it suits him. In his pathetic apology for the anal rape and torture of man, Ayoob conjured up a “duty of care” (to rape a man!) with zero evidence. Now he lies that members urged JPFO to die rather than accept the SAF takeover. Bullshit. I repeat: bullshit.

There were several parties who attempted to contact the JPFO board. They had alternatives and funding to back up their plans. The tiny August shortfall (roughly $1000) was easily covered; they people had 5-figure sums ready and waiting to be put to use. Ayoob dismisses these attempts at constructive engagement as “vitriol,” and any alternative to a takeover by the organization he represents as “clamored for JPFO to “die with dignity.”

Like the anal rape case, Ayoob creates a new reason that had never before been mentioned. Now his self-interested position as an SAF board member is to preserve the JPFO literature.The more likely outcome is that Gottlieb and his lackeys will suppress and attempt to shove the more strident JPFO work down the memory hole. It’s too uncompromising, too principled, too harsh.That attempt will fail. Neither Gottlieb or his lackey Ayoob can understand what has happened, and what will happen. The materials have already been preserved, by the people SAF and Ayoob love to hate. Watch for SAF attempts to suppress them via claims of copyright infringement. If there was any merit to Ayoob’s testilying, SAF would welcome all attempts to publicsize Zelman’s legacy. But since the truth is that the only prize is the JPFO mail lists, more grists for the for-profit Gottlieb mass mailing machine, that will never happen.

“s,” I will respond to your rant point by point, in order.

You started with the New Mexico case awhile back where you and others accused cops and docs of rape when police transported to a medical center a man they believed had stashed drugs up his butt.  I pointed out that anyone who works a patrol car OR an emergency room knows of people who’ve died from doing that. The cops brought him in, the docs did the colonoscopy, and I said we should wait to hear from the cops and the docs themselves why they made the decisions they did.  All these months later, those answers still have not come out.  I won’t make a judgment until they do. You, and those like you, are perfectly ready to form a lynch mob after hearing only one side of the story. I’m not, and I won’t apologize for that.

“s,” you write, “Now he (Ayoob) lies that members urged JPFO to die rather than accept the SAF takeover. Bullshit. I repeat: bullshit.”

The BS is on your end, “s.” I don’t know whether you deliberately lied, or whether you simply spoke from ignorance, but consider the following:

MamaLiberty, 9/1/14, at Claire Wolfe’s blog “1016” comments: “Nothing is forever, obviously. Seems to me an honorable death of the organization is preferable to what may become of it now… but we were not given a choice in the matter.”

MamaLiberty09_01_14

J. Eric Andreasen, 8/22/14, at Claire’s original blog entry on the topic, comments: “Claire, this is simply horrifying. Gottlieb is a KAPO, plain and simple. Better to burn JPFO to the ground and start anew.”

Claire08_22_14

On the same day in the same blog, Claire herself commented: “Kapo. Eric, that’s sad. But true. I tend to agree JPFO would be better off gone than turned into an SAF zombie.”

Andreasen08_22_14

“Kapo.” A term for Jews who were suborned by the Nazis and led other Jews into the death chambers.  A supreme insult to any Jew, particularly the one who just saved Jews for Preservation of Firearms Ownership from oblivion.  And your folks don’t spew vitriol, huh, “s”?  You say I’m wrong for imputing vitriol, yet in your own post you spew words like “lies,” “evidence from thin air,” “bullshit,” “lackeys,” and “testilying.” Can you spell i-r-o-n-y?  Or, h-y-p-o-c-r-i-s-y?

The record shows that JPFO came to SAF, not vice versa.  I think the coming months will see JPFO and its message stronger and more widely known than before…no thanks to you and those who think like you.  SAF will spread JPFO’s core message and research to a public that desperately needs to hear it, while you’re still hiding behind your cowardly internet anonymity, spewing your venom at people who’ve done more for gun owners’ civil rights than you ever have or will.

226 COMMENTS

  1. The case was about defending the arrestee because he can no longer defend himself (because he’s been disarmed or whatever).

    The question is where you got the idea that this is to extend to imposing surgical treatment.

  2. The case was about defending the arrestee because he can no longer defend himself (because he’s been disarmed or whatever).

    The question is where you got the idea that this is to extend to imposing surgical treatment.

  3. I never said it did, Frank. YOU said that, in your twisting of the discussion. I was asked about cops being responsible for the well-being of people in their custody. And I have, of course, answered that.

  4. I never said it did, Frank. YOU said that, in your twisting of the discussion. I was asked about cops being responsible for the well-being of people in their custody. And I have, of course, answered that.

  5. I never said it did, Frank. YOU said that, in your twisting of the discussion. I was asked about cops being responsible for the well-being of people in their custody. And I have, of course, answered that.

  6. I never said it did, Frank. YOU said that, in your twisting of the discussion. I was asked about cops being responsible for the well-being of people in their custody. And I have, of course, answered that.

  7. I never said it did, Frank. YOU said that, in your twisting of the discussion. I was asked about cops being responsible for the well-being of people in their custody. And I have, of course, answered that.

  8. By the way, folks…

    Frank, above, tells me that colonoscopy is considered surgery.

    I’m not a doc, so I’m not being a smart-ass when I honestly ask you all this:

    Many of you here have undergone colonoscopy. When that was done, did any of your physicians refer to it as “surgery” as opposed to “examination” or “procedure”?

    I’m curious to know.

  9. By the way, folks…

    Frank, above, tells me that colonoscopy is considered surgery.

    I’m not a doc, so I’m not being a smart-ass when I honestly ask you all this:

    Many of you here have undergone colonoscopy. When that was done, did any of your physicians refer to it as “surgery” as opposed to “examination” or “procedure”?

    I’m curious to know.

  10. By the way, folks…

    Frank, above, tells me that colonoscopy is considered surgery.

    I’m not a doc, so I’m not being a smart-ass when I honestly ask you all this:

    Many of you here have undergone colonoscopy. When that was done, did any of your physicians refer to it as “surgery” as opposed to “examination” or “procedure”?

    I’m curious to know.

  11. By the way, folks…

    Frank, above, tells me that colonoscopy is considered surgery.

    I’m not a doc, so I’m not being a smart-ass when I honestly ask you all this:

    Many of you here have undergone colonoscopy. When that was done, did any of your physicians refer to it as “surgery” as opposed to “examination” or “procedure”?

    I’m curious to know.

  12. By the way, folks…

    Frank, above, tells me that colonoscopy is considered surgery.

    I’m not a doc, so I’m not being a smart-ass when I honestly ask you all this:

    Many of you here have undergone colonoscopy. When that was done, did any of your physicians refer to it as “surgery” as opposed to “examination” or “procedure”?

    I’m curious to know.

  13. Note that how physicians may describe something to ease a patient’s mind is not necessarily technically accurate.

    But let’s simplify away from the surgery terminology. Tell me, do you believe the police have the right/power to force even an aspirin on a conscious non-consenting person in their custody?

  14. Note that how physicians may describe something to ease a patient’s mind is not necessarily technically accurate.

    But let’s simplify away from the surgery terminology. Tell me, do you believe the police have the right/power to force even an aspirin on a conscious non-consenting person in their custody?

  15. Note that how physicians may describe something to ease a patient’s mind is not necessarily technically accurate.

    But let’s simplify away from the surgery terminology. Tell me, do you believe the police have the right/power to force even an aspirin on a conscious non-consenting person in their custody?

  16. Note that how physicians may describe something to ease a patient’s mind is not necessarily technically accurate.

    But let’s simplify away from the surgery terminology. Tell me, do you believe the police have the right/power to force even an aspirin on a conscious non-consenting person in their custody?

  17. Note that how physicians may describe something to ease a patient’s mind is not necessarily technically accurate.

    But let’s simplify away from the surgery terminology. Tell me, do you believe the police have the right/power to force even an aspirin on a conscious non-consenting person in their custody?

  18. I’ve had several colonoscopy PROCEDURES over the years. None involved surgery. But then, I’ve visited some anti-cop/anarchy sites, and discovered they are much smarter than me. Do you know they have figured out how to put together “bug-out bags” with 3 types of rifles, six handguns, 2 shotguns, and a minimum of 5000 rounds of ammo for each, plus food and water for a week, shelter, 4 types of knives, a machete, axe, handsaw, 500 ft. of para-cord, four different fire making devices and a p-38 can opener. They are apparently much stronger than me also, as they plan to carry this 800 pound bug-out bag on their back while trekking into the countryside where they intend to overpower the hill folks and commandeer their stuff, eliminating all law enforcement they might encounter along the way.

    Give it up Mas. Folks like you, that only have decades of experience, extensive education, practical application of finely honed skills, and common sense going for you, can’t hope to compete with these mental giants.

  19. I’ve had several colonoscopy PROCEDURES over the years. None involved surgery. But then, I’ve visited some anti-cop/anarchy sites, and discovered they are much smarter than me. Do you know they have figured out how to put together “bug-out bags” with 3 types of rifles, six handguns, 2 shotguns, and a minimum of 5000 rounds of ammo for each, plus food and water for a week, shelter, 4 types of knives, a machete, axe, handsaw, 500 ft. of para-cord, four different fire making devices and a p-38 can opener. They are apparently much stronger than me also, as they plan to carry this 800 pound bug-out bag on their back while trekking into the countryside where they intend to overpower the hill folks and commandeer their stuff, eliminating all law enforcement they might encounter along the way.

    Give it up Mas. Folks like you, that only have decades of experience, extensive education, practical application of finely honed skills, and common sense going for you, can’t hope to compete with these mental giants.

  20. I’ve had several colonoscopy PROCEDURES over the years. None involved surgery. But then, I’ve visited some anti-cop/anarchy sites, and discovered they are much smarter than me. Do you know they have figured out how to put together “bug-out bags” with 3 types of rifles, six handguns, 2 shotguns, and a minimum of 5000 rounds of ammo for each, plus food and water for a week, shelter, 4 types of knives, a machete, axe, handsaw, 500 ft. of para-cord, four different fire making devices and a p-38 can opener. They are apparently much stronger than me also, as they plan to carry this 800 pound bug-out bag on their back while trekking into the countryside where they intend to overpower the hill folks and commandeer their stuff, eliminating all law enforcement they might encounter along the way.

    Give it up Mas. Folks like you, that only have decades of experience, extensive education, practical application of finely honed skills, and common sense going for you, can’t hope to compete with these mental giants.

  21. I’ve had several colonoscopy PROCEDURES over the years. None involved surgery. But then, I’ve visited some anti-cop/anarchy sites, and discovered they are much smarter than me. Do you know they have figured out how to put together “bug-out bags” with 3 types of rifles, six handguns, 2 shotguns, and a minimum of 5000 rounds of ammo for each, plus food and water for a week, shelter, 4 types of knives, a machete, axe, handsaw, 500 ft. of para-cord, four different fire making devices and a p-38 can opener. They are apparently much stronger than me also, as they plan to carry this 800 pound bug-out bag on their back while trekking into the countryside where they intend to overpower the hill folks and commandeer their stuff, eliminating all law enforcement they might encounter along the way.

    Give it up Mas. Folks like you, that only have decades of experience, extensive education, practical application of finely honed skills, and common sense going for you, can’t hope to compete with these mental giants.

  22. So, Frank…are you backpedalling on your “colonoscopy as surgery” statement, or are you saying doctors lie to their patients about what’s being done to them? Are you telling us that “colonscopy = surgery” is YOUR definition, and not a general definition in the practice of medicine.

    Folks, some of you may have come in late, so let me bring you up to speed. A while back in New Mexico, cops ran across a fellow who had a history of drug arrests. Observation involving “clenched buttocks” and a positive alert by a drug-sniffing dog created sufficient probable cause that he might have inserted drugs in his rectum that a judge issued a warrant for an anal cavity search. One clinic refused to touch it (literally), but at another, routine anal examination indicated to one medical practitioner that there was something in there. Perhaps out of abundance of caution — emergency room physicians and cops alike are acutely aware of containers rupturing inside the rectum and killing the drug mule who put them there — a physician then did a colonoscopy. No drugs were found.

    Police are taught that in such situations, the subject should be taken to a medical facility; from there it’s in the hands of the medical experts. In the very long dialogue about this last time, it became apparent that it’s a common doctrine in many emergency rooms now to let someone die if he refuses treatment.

    Hope that’s helpful for perspective.

    So, to answer Frank’s final question: the cops didn’t put a gun to the doctor’s head and demand them to perform a colonoscopy. That appears to have been the physician’s decision. But of course, Frank already knew that from our previous long dialogue.

    Frank now asks me,”Tell me, do you believe the police have the right/power to force even an aspirin on a conscious non-consenting person in their custody?”

    Frank, since I’ve already explained that by that point it was in the doctors’ hands and not those of the officers, I’ll answer your question with another.

    Let’s assume there’s a “jumper” on the tenth floor of a building, and you’re the cop inches away from him, negotiating with him through the open window. He tells you calmly, “Leave me alone, I want to die.” You realize that you can just grab him and pull him safely inside, and you believe that he may jump at any second.

    Are you going to rescue him, or are you going to let him die?

  23. So, Frank…are you backpedalling on your “colonoscopy as surgery” statement, or are you saying doctors lie to their patients about what’s being done to them? Are you telling us that “colonscopy = surgery” is YOUR definition, and not a general definition in the practice of medicine.

    Folks, some of you may have come in late, so let me bring you up to speed. A while back in New Mexico, cops ran across a fellow who had a history of drug arrests. Observation involving “clenched buttocks” and a positive alert by a drug-sniffing dog created sufficient probable cause that he might have inserted drugs in his rectum that a judge issued a warrant for an anal cavity search. One clinic refused to touch it (literally), but at another, routine anal examination indicated to one medical practitioner that there was something in there. Perhaps out of abundance of caution — emergency room physicians and cops alike are acutely aware of containers rupturing inside the rectum and killing the drug mule who put them there — a physician then did a colonoscopy. No drugs were found.

    Police are taught that in such situations, the subject should be taken to a medical facility; from there it’s in the hands of the medical experts. In the very long dialogue about this last time, it became apparent that it’s a common doctrine in many emergency rooms now to let someone die if he refuses treatment.

    Hope that’s helpful for perspective.

    So, to answer Frank’s final question: the cops didn’t put a gun to the doctor’s head and demand them to perform a colonoscopy. That appears to have been the physician’s decision. But of course, Frank already knew that from our previous long dialogue.

    Frank now asks me,”Tell me, do you believe the police have the right/power to force even an aspirin on a conscious non-consenting person in their custody?”

    Frank, since I’ve already explained that by that point it was in the doctors’ hands and not those of the officers, I’ll answer your question with another.

    Let’s assume there’s a “jumper” on the tenth floor of a building, and you’re the cop inches away from him, negotiating with him through the open window. He tells you calmly, “Leave me alone, I want to die.” You realize that you can just grab him and pull him safely inside, and you believe that he may jump at any second.

    Are you going to rescue him, or are you going to let him die?

  24. Mas,

    Thank you for the reference. Having reread that case (as it’s been a long time since I last read it, the last time I was pointed at the “no duty to protect argument”), I can see some of what you are arguing.

    However, looking at both DeShaney and the other two cases referenced in that paragraph you quoted (Estelle and Youngberg), I think you are missing any reference at all to what the limits of that “special relationship” might be.

    For example, DeShaney was differentiated from Estelle and Youngberg by the fact that the government didn’t have a special relationship and also that it played no role in creating the specific danger (specifically the abusive situation). In Estelle (and the later Helling vs McKinney), the specific harms/dangers came about through government action. (In Estelle from mandatory labor while incarcerated, and in Helling from refusal to move him away from a cellmate who constantly exposed him to second-hand smoke.) In Youngberg, the case related to the minimal standard of care for someone who had been committed to a state institution, which is essentially a harm created by the state.

    Essentially, by my reading of those cases, the “special relationship” creates a “duty to care” if by the nature of restricting their liberty (such as by putting them into custody) the police are creating a potential threat to their life. Would you agree that is a fair description? If not, what am I missing?

    If we accept that description, I still don’t see how that creates a “duty to care” in the New Mexico case, such that it would allow the police the authority to override the expressed medical wishes of their prisoner. By arresting Eckert, the police were not creating a hazardous situation that was preventing him from receiving medical treatment. They provided numerous opportunities to receive that treatment, which Eckert declined repeatedly. From what I can see, once the police offered the access to treatment, their “duty to care” was fulfilled. Nothing in that “duty to care” obligated or authorized them to force any medical care on Eckert against his will.

    What, then, am I missing from your view of things? What do you understand the limits of that “duty to care” to be? Does it mean that police are authorized to take any measures that they deem required to provide for someone in custody? How does that interact with the detained individual’s civil rights? Does it override them? Or at what point are the police no longer authorized to force care on someone who refuses it?

    For example, should police force feed a prisoner who has stated an intention to go on a hunger strike? Under the World Medical Association’s Declaration of Tokyo, it would be considered unethical for a doctor to force feed a patient on a hunger strike (as long as it could be determined that the patient was rational). From the Declaration:

    “Where a prisoner refuses nourishment and is considered by the physician as capable of forming an unimpaired and rational judgment concerning the consequences of such a voluntary refusal of nourishment, he or she shall not be fed artificially. The decision as to the capacity of the prisoner to form such a judgment should be confirmed by at least one other independent physician. The consequences of the refusal of nourishment shall be explained by the physician to the prisoner.”

    If force feeding a prisoner against their will would be an ethical violation, what is the difference between that and forcing other medical procedures on them against their will? Would you argue that the police have a greater “duty to care” than a doctor would at that point?

    I would honestly like to know your answers to these questions, and see any other sources you could suggest on the limits of the “duty to care” (if any exist).

  25. Mas,

    Thank you for the reference. Having reread that case (as it’s been a long time since I last read it, the last time I was pointed at the “no duty to protect argument”), I can see some of what you are arguing.

    However, looking at both DeShaney and the other two cases referenced in that paragraph you quoted (Estelle and Youngberg), I think you are missing any reference at all to what the limits of that “special relationship” might be.

    For example, DeShaney was differentiated from Estelle and Youngberg by the fact that the government didn’t have a special relationship and also that it played no role in creating the specific danger (specifically the abusive situation). In Estelle (and the later Helling vs McKinney), the specific harms/dangers came about through government action. (In Estelle from mandatory labor while incarcerated, and in Helling from refusal to move him away from a cellmate who constantly exposed him to second-hand smoke.) In Youngberg, the case related to the minimal standard of care for someone who had been committed to a state institution, which is essentially a harm created by the state.

    Essentially, by my reading of those cases, the “special relationship” creates a “duty to care” if by the nature of restricting their liberty (such as by putting them into custody) the police are creating a potential threat to their life. Would you agree that is a fair description? If not, what am I missing?

    If we accept that description, I still don’t see how that creates a “duty to care” in the New Mexico case, such that it would allow the police the authority to override the expressed medical wishes of their prisoner. By arresting Eckert, the police were not creating a hazardous situation that was preventing him from receiving medical treatment. They provided numerous opportunities to receive that treatment, which Eckert declined repeatedly. From what I can see, once the police offered the access to treatment, their “duty to care” was fulfilled. Nothing in that “duty to care” obligated or authorized them to force any medical care on Eckert against his will.

    What, then, am I missing from your view of things? What do you understand the limits of that “duty to care” to be? Does it mean that police are authorized to take any measures that they deem required to provide for someone in custody? How does that interact with the detained individual’s civil rights? Does it override them? Or at what point are the police no longer authorized to force care on someone who refuses it?

    For example, should police force feed a prisoner who has stated an intention to go on a hunger strike? Under the World Medical Association’s Declaration of Tokyo, it would be considered unethical for a doctor to force feed a patient on a hunger strike (as long as it could be determined that the patient was rational). From the Declaration:

    “Where a prisoner refuses nourishment and is considered by the physician as capable of forming an unimpaired and rational judgment concerning the consequences of such a voluntary refusal of nourishment, he or she shall not be fed artificially. The decision as to the capacity of the prisoner to form such a judgment should be confirmed by at least one other independent physician. The consequences of the refusal of nourishment shall be explained by the physician to the prisoner.”

    If force feeding a prisoner against their will would be an ethical violation, what is the difference between that and forcing other medical procedures on them against their will? Would you argue that the police have a greater “duty to care” than a doctor would at that point?

    I would honestly like to know your answers to these questions, and see any other sources you could suggest on the limits of the “duty to care” (if any exist).

  26. Mas,

    Thank you for the reference. Having reread that case (as it’s been a long time since I last read it, the last time I was pointed at the “no duty to protect argument”), I can see some of what you are arguing.

    However, looking at both DeShaney and the other two cases referenced in that paragraph you quoted (Estelle and Youngberg), I think you are missing any reference at all to what the limits of that “special relationship” might be.

    For example, DeShaney was differentiated from Estelle and Youngberg by the fact that the government didn’t have a special relationship and also that it played no role in creating the specific danger (specifically the abusive situation). In Estelle (and the later Helling vs McKinney), the specific harms/dangers came about through government action. (In Estelle from mandatory labor while incarcerated, and in Helling from refusal to move him away from a cellmate who constantly exposed him to second-hand smoke.) In Youngberg, the case related to the minimal standard of care for someone who had been committed to a state institution, which is essentially a harm created by the state.

    Essentially, by my reading of those cases, the “special relationship” creates a “duty to care” if by the nature of restricting their liberty (such as by putting them into custody) the police are creating a potential threat to their life. Would you agree that is a fair description? If not, what am I missing?

    If we accept that description, I still don’t see how that creates a “duty to care” in the New Mexico case, such that it would allow the police the authority to override the expressed medical wishes of their prisoner. By arresting Eckert, the police were not creating a hazardous situation that was preventing him from receiving medical treatment. They provided numerous opportunities to receive that treatment, which Eckert declined repeatedly. From what I can see, once the police offered the access to treatment, their “duty to care” was fulfilled. Nothing in that “duty to care” obligated or authorized them to force any medical care on Eckert against his will.

    What, then, am I missing from your view of things? What do you understand the limits of that “duty to care” to be? Does it mean that police are authorized to take any measures that they deem required to provide for someone in custody? How does that interact with the detained individual’s civil rights? Does it override them? Or at what point are the police no longer authorized to force care on someone who refuses it?

    For example, should police force feed a prisoner who has stated an intention to go on a hunger strike? Under the World Medical Association’s Declaration of Tokyo, it would be considered unethical for a doctor to force feed a patient on a hunger strike (as long as it could be determined that the patient was rational). From the Declaration:

    “Where a prisoner refuses nourishment and is considered by the physician as capable of forming an unimpaired and rational judgment concerning the consequences of such a voluntary refusal of nourishment, he or she shall not be fed artificially. The decision as to the capacity of the prisoner to form such a judgment should be confirmed by at least one other independent physician. The consequences of the refusal of nourishment shall be explained by the physician to the prisoner.”

    If force feeding a prisoner against their will would be an ethical violation, what is the difference between that and forcing other medical procedures on them against their will? Would you argue that the police have a greater “duty to care” than a doctor would at that point?

    I would honestly like to know your answers to these questions, and see any other sources you could suggest on the limits of the “duty to care” (if any exist).

  27. Mas,

    Thank you for the reference. Having reread that case (as it’s been a long time since I last read it, the last time I was pointed at the “no duty to protect argument”), I can see some of what you are arguing.

    However, looking at both DeShaney and the other two cases referenced in that paragraph you quoted (Estelle and Youngberg), I think you are missing any reference at all to what the limits of that “special relationship” might be.

    For example, DeShaney was differentiated from Estelle and Youngberg by the fact that the government didn’t have a special relationship and also that it played no role in creating the specific danger (specifically the abusive situation). In Estelle (and the later Helling vs McKinney), the specific harms/dangers came about through government action. (In Estelle from mandatory labor while incarcerated, and in Helling from refusal to move him away from a cellmate who constantly exposed him to second-hand smoke.) In Youngberg, the case related to the minimal standard of care for someone who had been committed to a state institution, which is essentially a harm created by the state.

    Essentially, by my reading of those cases, the “special relationship” creates a “duty to care” if by the nature of restricting their liberty (such as by putting them into custody) the police are creating a potential threat to their life. Would you agree that is a fair description? If not, what am I missing?

    If we accept that description, I still don’t see how that creates a “duty to care” in the New Mexico case, such that it would allow the police the authority to override the expressed medical wishes of their prisoner. By arresting Eckert, the police were not creating a hazardous situation that was preventing him from receiving medical treatment. They provided numerous opportunities to receive that treatment, which Eckert declined repeatedly. From what I can see, once the police offered the access to treatment, their “duty to care” was fulfilled. Nothing in that “duty to care” obligated or authorized them to force any medical care on Eckert against his will.

    What, then, am I missing from your view of things? What do you understand the limits of that “duty to care” to be? Does it mean that police are authorized to take any measures that they deem required to provide for someone in custody? How does that interact with the detained individual’s civil rights? Does it override them? Or at what point are the police no longer authorized to force care on someone who refuses it?

    For example, should police force feed a prisoner who has stated an intention to go on a hunger strike? Under the World Medical Association’s Declaration of Tokyo, it would be considered unethical for a doctor to force feed a patient on a hunger strike (as long as it could be determined that the patient was rational). From the Declaration:

    “Where a prisoner refuses nourishment and is considered by the physician as capable of forming an unimpaired and rational judgment concerning the consequences of such a voluntary refusal of nourishment, he or she shall not be fed artificially. The decision as to the capacity of the prisoner to form such a judgment should be confirmed by at least one other independent physician. The consequences of the refusal of nourishment shall be explained by the physician to the prisoner.”

    If force feeding a prisoner against their will would be an ethical violation, what is the difference between that and forcing other medical procedures on them against their will? Would you argue that the police have a greater “duty to care” than a doctor would at that point?

    I would honestly like to know your answers to these questions, and see any other sources you could suggest on the limits of the “duty to care” (if any exist).

  28. Mas,

    Thank you for the reference. Having reread that case (as it’s been a long time since I last read it, the last time I was pointed at the “no duty to protect argument”), I can see some of what you are arguing.

    However, looking at both DeShaney and the other two cases referenced in that paragraph you quoted (Estelle and Youngberg), I think you are missing any reference at all to what the limits of that “special relationship” might be.

    For example, DeShaney was differentiated from Estelle and Youngberg by the fact that the government didn’t have a special relationship and also that it played no role in creating the specific danger (specifically the abusive situation). In Estelle (and the later Helling vs McKinney), the specific harms/dangers came about through government action. (In Estelle from mandatory labor while incarcerated, and in Helling from refusal to move him away from a cellmate who constantly exposed him to second-hand smoke.) In Youngberg, the case related to the minimal standard of care for someone who had been committed to a state institution, which is essentially a harm created by the state.

    Essentially, by my reading of those cases, the “special relationship” creates a “duty to care” if by the nature of restricting their liberty (such as by putting them into custody) the police are creating a potential threat to their life. Would you agree that is a fair description? If not, what am I missing?

    If we accept that description, I still don’t see how that creates a “duty to care” in the New Mexico case, such that it would allow the police the authority to override the expressed medical wishes of their prisoner. By arresting Eckert, the police were not creating a hazardous situation that was preventing him from receiving medical treatment. They provided numerous opportunities to receive that treatment, which Eckert declined repeatedly. From what I can see, once the police offered the access to treatment, their “duty to care” was fulfilled. Nothing in that “duty to care” obligated or authorized them to force any medical care on Eckert against his will.

    What, then, am I missing from your view of things? What do you understand the limits of that “duty to care” to be? Does it mean that police are authorized to take any measures that they deem required to provide for someone in custody? How does that interact with the detained individual’s civil rights? Does it override them? Or at what point are the police no longer authorized to force care on someone who refuses it?

    For example, should police force feed a prisoner who has stated an intention to go on a hunger strike? Under the World Medical Association’s Declaration of Tokyo, it would be considered unethical for a doctor to force feed a patient on a hunger strike (as long as it could be determined that the patient was rational). From the Declaration:

    “Where a prisoner refuses nourishment and is considered by the physician as capable of forming an unimpaired and rational judgment concerning the consequences of such a voluntary refusal of nourishment, he or she shall not be fed artificially. The decision as to the capacity of the prisoner to form such a judgment should be confirmed by at least one other independent physician. The consequences of the refusal of nourishment shall be explained by the physician to the prisoner.”

    If force feeding a prisoner against their will would be an ethical violation, what is the difference between that and forcing other medical procedures on them against their will? Would you argue that the police have a greater “duty to care” than a doctor would at that point?

    I would honestly like to know your answers to these questions, and see any other sources you could suggest on the limits of the “duty to care” (if any exist).

  29. Observer, you ask: “Essentially, by my reading of those cases, the ‘special relationship’ creates a ‘duty to care’ if by the nature of restricting their liberty (such as by putting them into custody) the police are creating a potential threat to their life. Would you agree that is a fair description? If not, what am I missing?”

    No, I would not agree, and since you ask, what you are missing is this: The police had reason to believe Eckert had inserted dangerous drugs into his body cavity, reason enough for a judge to issue a warrant for an anal cavity search. In that situation, this meant that Eckert, not the officers, had created “the potential threat to (his own) life.”

    Your hunger strike analogy is apples and oranges. Malnutrition results in slow death, leaving relatively ample time for courts, medical ethics boards, and a hospital’s board of regents to analyze the matter and consider alternatives. A baggie or condom full of drugs that could any minute rupture and kill the person who had “keestered” them is a much more exigent circumstance.

    The exigent circumstance in turn triggers the doctrine of competing harms, also known as the doctrine of necessity and the doctrine of two evils. Basically, it means that you are allowed to break the rules in the rare, exigent-circumstance-created situation where following the rules would cause more human injury than breaking them, as seen through the lens of the reasonable man doctrine.

  30. Observer, you ask: “Essentially, by my reading of those cases, the ‘special relationship’ creates a ‘duty to care’ if by the nature of restricting their liberty (such as by putting them into custody) the police are creating a potential threat to their life. Would you agree that is a fair description? If not, what am I missing?”

    No, I would not agree, and since you ask, what you are missing is this: The police had reason to believe Eckert had inserted dangerous drugs into his body cavity, reason enough for a judge to issue a warrant for an anal cavity search. In that situation, this meant that Eckert, not the officers, had created “the potential threat to (his own) life.”

    Your hunger strike analogy is apples and oranges. Malnutrition results in slow death, leaving relatively ample time for courts, medical ethics boards, and a hospital’s board of regents to analyze the matter and consider alternatives. A baggie or condom full of drugs that could any minute rupture and kill the person who had “keestered” them is a much more exigent circumstance.

    The exigent circumstance in turn triggers the doctrine of competing harms, also known as the doctrine of necessity and the doctrine of two evils. Basically, it means that you are allowed to break the rules in the rare, exigent-circumstance-created situation where following the rules would cause more human injury than breaking them, as seen through the lens of the reasonable man doctrine.

  31. Observer, you ask: “Essentially, by my reading of those cases, the ‘special relationship’ creates a ‘duty to care’ if by the nature of restricting their liberty (such as by putting them into custody) the police are creating a potential threat to their life. Would you agree that is a fair description? If not, what am I missing?”

    No, I would not agree, and since you ask, what you are missing is this: The police had reason to believe Eckert had inserted dangerous drugs into his body cavity, reason enough for a judge to issue a warrant for an anal cavity search. In that situation, this meant that Eckert, not the officers, had created “the potential threat to (his own) life.”

    Your hunger strike analogy is apples and oranges. Malnutrition results in slow death, leaving relatively ample time for courts, medical ethics boards, and a hospital’s board of regents to analyze the matter and consider alternatives. A baggie or condom full of drugs that could any minute rupture and kill the person who had “keestered” them is a much more exigent circumstance.

    The exigent circumstance in turn triggers the doctrine of competing harms, also known as the doctrine of necessity and the doctrine of two evils. Basically, it means that you are allowed to break the rules in the rare, exigent-circumstance-created situation where following the rules would cause more human injury than breaking them, as seen through the lens of the reasonable man doctrine.

  32. Observer, you ask: “Essentially, by my reading of those cases, the ‘special relationship’ creates a ‘duty to care’ if by the nature of restricting their liberty (such as by putting them into custody) the police are creating a potential threat to their life. Would you agree that is a fair description? If not, what am I missing?”

    No, I would not agree, and since you ask, what you are missing is this: The police had reason to believe Eckert had inserted dangerous drugs into his body cavity, reason enough for a judge to issue a warrant for an anal cavity search. In that situation, this meant that Eckert, not the officers, had created “the potential threat to (his own) life.”

    Your hunger strike analogy is apples and oranges. Malnutrition results in slow death, leaving relatively ample time for courts, medical ethics boards, and a hospital’s board of regents to analyze the matter and consider alternatives. A baggie or condom full of drugs that could any minute rupture and kill the person who had “keestered” them is a much more exigent circumstance.

    The exigent circumstance in turn triggers the doctrine of competing harms, also known as the doctrine of necessity and the doctrine of two evils. Basically, it means that you are allowed to break the rules in the rare, exigent-circumstance-created situation where following the rules would cause more human injury than breaking them, as seen through the lens of the reasonable man doctrine.

  33. Observer, you ask: “Essentially, by my reading of those cases, the ‘special relationship’ creates a ‘duty to care’ if by the nature of restricting their liberty (such as by putting them into custody) the police are creating a potential threat to their life. Would you agree that is a fair description? If not, what am I missing?”

    No, I would not agree, and since you ask, what you are missing is this: The police had reason to believe Eckert had inserted dangerous drugs into his body cavity, reason enough for a judge to issue a warrant for an anal cavity search. In that situation, this meant that Eckert, not the officers, had created “the potential threat to (his own) life.”

    Your hunger strike analogy is apples and oranges. Malnutrition results in slow death, leaving relatively ample time for courts, medical ethics boards, and a hospital’s board of regents to analyze the matter and consider alternatives. A baggie or condom full of drugs that could any minute rupture and kill the person who had “keestered” them is a much more exigent circumstance.

    The exigent circumstance in turn triggers the doctrine of competing harms, also known as the doctrine of necessity and the doctrine of two evils. Basically, it means that you are allowed to break the rules in the rare, exigent-circumstance-created situation where following the rules would cause more human injury than breaking them, as seen through the lens of the reasonable man doctrine.

  34. Interesting question you’re asking Frank, Mas. Once I responded to a “jumper” call. A naked, 300+lb. African-American female was sitting on the guard rail on an over-pass, facing on-coming rush hour traffic speeding by some 20 ft. below, screaming she was going to jump. My sergeant engaged her in conversation while I low crawled some 150 ft. from the other end of the bridge and was able to grab her and pull her to safety.
    At the time we thought we had accomplished a good thing. Now, after reading the posts of some folks, my partner and I most likely violated her rights and I most certainly should have faced assault charges, as she suffered numerous scrapes and bruises when I pulled her to what I believed to be safety.
    And to believe witnesses hailed us as heroes! If I had not been so poorly trained and had a better understanding of citizen rights, I would not have ruined a perfectly good uniform and pair of Wellington boots that day.

  35. Interesting question you’re asking Frank, Mas. Once I responded to a “jumper” call. A naked, 300+lb. African-American female was sitting on the guard rail on an over-pass, facing on-coming rush hour traffic speeding by some 20 ft. below, screaming she was going to jump. My sergeant engaged her in conversation while I low crawled some 150 ft. from the other end of the bridge and was able to grab her and pull her to safety.
    At the time we thought we had accomplished a good thing. Now, after reading the posts of some folks, my partner and I most likely violated her rights and I most certainly should have faced assault charges, as she suffered numerous scrapes and bruises when I pulled her to what I believed to be safety.
    And to believe witnesses hailed us as heroes! If I had not been so poorly trained and had a better understanding of citizen rights, I would not have ruined a perfectly good uniform and pair of Wellington boots that day.

  36. Interesting question you’re asking Frank, Mas. Once I responded to a “jumper” call. A naked, 300+lb. African-American female was sitting on the guard rail on an over-pass, facing on-coming rush hour traffic speeding by some 20 ft. below, screaming she was going to jump. My sergeant engaged her in conversation while I low crawled some 150 ft. from the other end of the bridge and was able to grab her and pull her to safety.
    At the time we thought we had accomplished a good thing. Now, after reading the posts of some folks, my partner and I most likely violated her rights and I most certainly should have faced assault charges, as she suffered numerous scrapes and bruises when I pulled her to what I believed to be safety.
    And to believe witnesses hailed us as heroes! If I had not been so poorly trained and had a better understanding of citizen rights, I would not have ruined a perfectly good uniform and pair of Wellington boots that day.

  37. Interesting question you’re asking Frank, Mas. Once I responded to a “jumper” call. A naked, 300+lb. African-American female was sitting on the guard rail on an over-pass, facing on-coming rush hour traffic speeding by some 20 ft. below, screaming she was going to jump. My sergeant engaged her in conversation while I low crawled some 150 ft. from the other end of the bridge and was able to grab her and pull her to safety.
    At the time we thought we had accomplished a good thing. Now, after reading the posts of some folks, my partner and I most likely violated her rights and I most certainly should have faced assault charges, as she suffered numerous scrapes and bruises when I pulled her to what I believed to be safety.
    And to believe witnesses hailed us as heroes! If I had not been so poorly trained and had a better understanding of citizen rights, I would not have ruined a perfectly good uniform and pair of Wellington boots that day.

  38. Interesting question you’re asking Frank, Mas. Once I responded to a “jumper” call. A naked, 300+lb. African-American female was sitting on the guard rail on an over-pass, facing on-coming rush hour traffic speeding by some 20 ft. below, screaming she was going to jump. My sergeant engaged her in conversation while I low crawled some 150 ft. from the other end of the bridge and was able to grab her and pull her to safety.
    At the time we thought we had accomplished a good thing. Now, after reading the posts of some folks, my partner and I most likely violated her rights and I most certainly should have faced assault charges, as she suffered numerous scrapes and bruises when I pulled her to what I believed to be safety.
    And to believe witnesses hailed us as heroes! If I had not been so poorly trained and had a better understanding of citizen rights, I would not have ruined a perfectly good uniform and pair of Wellington boots that day.

  39. Mas, so your answer to my aspirin hypothetical must be a no: you do not believe that a police officer can force someone to take an aspirin. Well, that’s a relief. He can instead deliver someone to a doctor, and if she happens to do the forcing, that’s OK with you (though not with medical ethics/law, as we have previously shown). But if so … why all your minimizing of the colonoscopy procedure’s nature as “surgery”? Why would it matter for your purposes?

  40. Mas, so your answer to my aspirin hypothetical must be a no: you do not believe that a police officer can force someone to take an aspirin. Well, that’s a relief. He can instead deliver someone to a doctor, and if she happens to do the forcing, that’s OK with you (though not with medical ethics/law, as we have previously shown). But if so … why all your minimizing of the colonoscopy procedure’s nature as “surgery”? Why would it matter for your purposes?

  41. Mas, so your answer to my aspirin hypothetical must be a no: you do not believe that a police officer can force someone to take an aspirin. Well, that’s a relief. He can instead deliver someone to a doctor, and if she happens to do the forcing, that’s OK with you (though not with medical ethics/law, as we have previously shown). But if so … why all your minimizing of the colonoscopy procedure’s nature as “surgery”? Why would it matter for your purposes?

  42. Mas, so your answer to my aspirin hypothetical must be a no: you do not believe that a police officer can force someone to take an aspirin. Well, that’s a relief. He can instead deliver someone to a doctor, and if she happens to do the forcing, that’s OK with you (though not with medical ethics/law, as we have previously shown). But if so … why all your minimizing of the colonoscopy procedure’s nature as “surgery”? Why would it matter for your purposes?

  43. Mas, so your answer to my aspirin hypothetical must be a no: you do not believe that a police officer can force someone to take an aspirin. Well, that’s a relief. He can instead deliver someone to a doctor, and if she happens to do the forcing, that’s OK with you (though not with medical ethics/law, as we have previously shown). But if so … why all your minimizing of the colonoscopy procedure’s nature as “surgery”? Why would it matter for your purposes?

  44. Dennis: you nailed it. The late Preston Covey, head of the Institute for Applied Ethics, used to say that the difference between theoretical ethics and applied ethics was that the first was discussed in the safety of ivory towers at great length, and the latter happens “when the rubber meets the road” and you have seconds or even a fraction of a second to decide what to do, with life on the line.

    And thank you for saving that poor woman’s life.

    Frank: It’s interesting that you completely avoided my question. Please answer: what would you do with that hypothetical case of the jumper? What do you think is the right thing to do there?

    Frank, YOU were the one who said colonoscopy was surgery, a position as yet unsupported by anyone else here, so don’t BS my readers by suggesting that I’m “minimizing” when you’re the one who appears to be exaggerating.

    And, by the way, street cops don’t dispense medication…including aspirin.

  45. Dennis: you nailed it. The late Preston Covey, head of the Institute for Applied Ethics, used to say that the difference between theoretical ethics and applied ethics was that the first was discussed in the safety of ivory towers at great length, and the latter happens “when the rubber meets the road” and you have seconds or even a fraction of a second to decide what to do, with life on the line.

    And thank you for saving that poor woman’s life.

    Frank: It’s interesting that you completely avoided my question. Please answer: what would you do with that hypothetical case of the jumper? What do you think is the right thing to do there?

    Frank, YOU were the one who said colonoscopy was surgery, a position as yet unsupported by anyone else here, so don’t BS my readers by suggesting that I’m “minimizing” when you’re the one who appears to be exaggerating.

    And, by the way, street cops don’t dispense medication…including aspirin.

  46. Dennis: you nailed it. The late Preston Covey, head of the Institute for Applied Ethics, used to say that the difference between theoretical ethics and applied ethics was that the first was discussed in the safety of ivory towers at great length, and the latter happens “when the rubber meets the road” and you have seconds or even a fraction of a second to decide what to do, with life on the line.

    And thank you for saving that poor woman’s life.

    Frank: It’s interesting that you completely avoided my question. Please answer: what would you do with that hypothetical case of the jumper? What do you think is the right thing to do there?

    Frank, YOU were the one who said colonoscopy was surgery, a position as yet unsupported by anyone else here, so don’t BS my readers by suggesting that I’m “minimizing” when you’re the one who appears to be exaggerating.

    And, by the way, street cops don’t dispense medication…including aspirin.

  47. Dennis: you nailed it. The late Preston Covey, head of the Institute for Applied Ethics, used to say that the difference between theoretical ethics and applied ethics was that the first was discussed in the safety of ivory towers at great length, and the latter happens “when the rubber meets the road” and you have seconds or even a fraction of a second to decide what to do, with life on the line.

    And thank you for saving that poor woman’s life.

    Frank: It’s interesting that you completely avoided my question. Please answer: what would you do with that hypothetical case of the jumper? What do you think is the right thing to do there?

    Frank, YOU were the one who said colonoscopy was surgery, a position as yet unsupported by anyone else here, so don’t BS my readers by suggesting that I’m “minimizing” when you’re the one who appears to be exaggerating.

    And, by the way, street cops don’t dispense medication…including aspirin.

  48. Dennis: you nailed it. The late Preston Covey, head of the Institute for Applied Ethics, used to say that the difference between theoretical ethics and applied ethics was that the first was discussed in the safety of ivory towers at great length, and the latter happens “when the rubber meets the road” and you have seconds or even a fraction of a second to decide what to do, with life on the line.

    And thank you for saving that poor woman’s life.

    Frank: It’s interesting that you completely avoided my question. Please answer: what would you do with that hypothetical case of the jumper? What do you think is the right thing to do there?

    Frank, YOU were the one who said colonoscopy was surgery, a position as yet unsupported by anyone else here, so don’t BS my readers by suggesting that I’m “minimizing” when you’re the one who appears to be exaggerating.

    And, by the way, street cops don’t dispense medication…including aspirin.

  49. If but why when then with where bad stupid evil corrupt incompetent low intelligence civil rights violating brutal poorly trained retarded worthless murderous thug jack-booted militarized useless waste of taxpayer’s money abusive always?
    Mas, I challenge you to deny this logic.
    Hah! Just as I thought, you can’t even grasp what was asked! How do you expect to stand up against these incredibly intelligent visitors to your blog?

  50. If but why when then with where bad stupid evil corrupt incompetent low intelligence civil rights violating brutal poorly trained retarded worthless murderous thug jack-booted militarized useless waste of taxpayer’s money abusive always?
    Mas, I challenge you to deny this logic.
    Hah! Just as I thought, you can’t even grasp what was asked! How do you expect to stand up against these incredibly intelligent visitors to your blog?

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